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Abstract
In many markets, homogenous goods and services are sold both by
large global firms and small local firms. Surprisingly, the large firms
charge, often substantially, higher prices. Examples include hotels,
airlines, and coffee shops. This paper provides a parsimonious model
that can account for these pricing patterns. In this model, consumers
face costs when switching from one supplier to another and consumers
change locations with a given positive probability. Consequently, large
firms or ”chain stores” insure consumers against this switching cost.
The model predicts that chain stores and local stores coexist in equi-
librium and that chain stores charge higher prices and yet attract more
consumers than local stores. As consumer mobility increases, the prof-
its of both local stores and chain stores increase, but the chain stores’
profits increase at a faster rate.
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1 Introduction
A bus trip from New York City to Boston is a fairly homogenous good. It
takes about four hours and twenty minutes and costs US$55 at the Grey-
hound/Peter Pan desk and US$15 at the Fung-Wah desk.1 Similarly, a big
cup of milk coffee in the Big Cup Cafe´ on 8th Avenue in Manhattan costs
US$3.60, while the largest cup of cafe´ latte in the Starbucks cafe´ on the
other side of the avenue is sold at US$4.90.2 Most strikingly perhaps, the
airfare for a return flight from Berlin to Cologne-Bonn costs Euro 395 if one
flies with Lufthansa and Euro 53 if one travels with German Wings.3
What is the common feature of these three pricing patterns? First,
arguably homogenous goods are sold at, sometimes substantially, different
prices. Second, one of the sellers is a large firm that is more or less globally
active and known by almost every potential consumer, while the other seller
is a small local firm that is most probably only known by customers familiar
with the locality. Third, the large firm charges the high price.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a parsimonious model that ex-
plains pricing patterns such as these. As the larger firms sell at higher
prices, it is clear from the outset that economies of scale cannot explain
1Prices are as of May 2005. If one buys the tickets online, one pays US$28-35 with
Greyhound/Peter Pan and US$15 with Fung-Wah. Greyhound/Peter Pan trips begin in
Midtown Manhattan on 42nd street, while Fung-Wah trips start in Chinatown in Man-
hattan on Canal street. Both trips end at Boston South station.
2Both cafe´s are between 21st and 22nd street. Prices are as of spring 2005. The Big
Cup Cafe´ attracts mainly people from the gay and lesbian community, so one might argue
that reduced willingness to pay of heterosexuals is a reason why Big Cup’s prices are lower.
There are two counterarguments. First, both cafe´s are in the heart of the gay community
in Chelsea, so more or less the same issue arises for the Starbucks Cafe´ vis-a`-vis. Second,
there are other services (like free wireless internet) provided by Big Cup that may at least
partially offset any other discomfort felt by some customers.
3Sources: www.lufthansa.de and www.germanwings.com. We choose return flights
because these are cheaper than one-way tickets for major carriers such as Lufthansa. The
price of the German Wings return ticket is the sum of two one-way tickets. The date of
booking was July 21, 2005. Lufthansa’s airport in Berlin is Tegel, while German Wings
flies from and to Berlin Scho¨nefeld. For an outbound flight from Berlin to Cologne-Bonn,
we arbitrarily chose July 28 round 8 a.m. For the return flight, we chose August, 1, round
7 p.m. Though the price differences vary as a function of various factors such as date
and flexibility, there can be little doubt that German Wings is substantially cheaper than
Lufthansa.
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these patterns. What seems to be at work here is a non-convexity in the
consumption technology. Potential customers of local firms must first learn
about the existence of the local provider. Once they know this, they have
to experiment whether the goods and services provided by the local store
suit their preferences, and eventually have to learn how to best consume
these. If this type of search and experimentation is costly, buying from a
new provider involves a sort of set-up cost. Thus, these set-up costs are a
kind of switching costs.
Of course, the same is true for new customers of global firms, or chain
stores, as we call them. The twist, though, is that if customers are mobile
and consume repeatedly, they have to incur the set-up cost only once when
buying from the chain store, whereas these costs have to be borne each time
they buy from another local store. Moving from one location to the other
with an exogenous probability, consumers cannot always buy from the same
local firm. Consequently, they risk to incur the set-up costs anew when first
buying from a local firm. Since chain stores help consumers save switching
costs, they may be able to charge higher prices and yet to attract more
customers than do local firms.
Put in a nutshell, this is the explanation our paper suggests. So as to
back up the intuition just outlined, we develop the following model. Con-
sumers are located in two identical cities and live for two periods. With
a given probability, they move from one city to the other after the first
period. In each period, they can either buy from a local store or from a
chain store, which both supply the same good. Before they buy from a
given store for the first time, each consumer incurs a set-up cost. While all
consumers value the good in the same way and face the same probability
of moving, they are heterogenous with respect to the switching costs. We
show that in the unique equilibrium, both types of stores are active. The
chain store charges a higher price and attracts more consumers than do local
stores. Low switching cost consumers buy from the local stores and high
switching costs consumers buy from the chain store. Moreover, the relative
profitability of the chain store increases as consumers become more mobile.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
relates the paper to the existing literature. Section 3 introduces the model.
Section 4 analyzes the benchmark case with two local monopolies, while
section 5 derives the unique equilibrium for the market structure with two
local stores competing with a chain. Section 6 then shows that the market
structure with a local store in each city and a chain store active in both
cities is the unique stable market structure if there is a small, positive entry
cost. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, the idea that larger firms may gain more
customers while charging higher prices than smaller firms merely because
of consumers’ switching costs has not been fully recognized in the previous
formal literature.4 For example, Stahl (1982) notes that a merger of local
stores to a chain store “appears exclusively connected to the input side of
the retailing activity, that is, to the exhaustion of economies of scale in
purchasing and distributing inputs.”
Switching costs as understood in this paper are a short-cut to search and
experimentation costs a` la Nelson (1970), where consumers have to search
and experiment so as to find their most preferred good. Insofar as our
model does not allow for dynamic price competition, it is in some contrast
to a part of the switching cost literature. For example, Klemperer (1987,
1995)’s major concern is with the dynamic aspects of price competition when
consumers are locked in with their supplier due to switching costs, so that
sellers are tempted to use ’bargains followed by ripoffs’- pricing schemes
(Farrell and Klemperer, 2004). However, our approach is perfectly in line
with von Weizsa¨cker (1984), whom we follow by assuming that firms do not
set different prices over time.
Two papers that deal with search costs but are not concerned with
4For a non-formal argument that goes along with the main idea of our paper, see
McAfee (2002, ch.4).
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switching costs are Stahl (1982) and Wolinsky (1983). Stahl illustrates how a
model of demand externalities creates a similar agglomeration effect. Wolin-
sky presents a model where imperfect information creates the need to search
for a suitable buy, leading firms to cluster at one location in order to reduce
search costs.
Baye and Morgan (2001) provide a model with equilibrium dispersion
of publicized prices, which arise because some consumers decide not to pay
the fee required to become informed about prices.5 Insofar as in our model
high switching cost consumers prefer paying higher prices to bearing the
switching cost, this is very similar to our model. In the model of Baye
and Morgan, though, the high and low priced firms are not determined ex
ante because the price dispersion stems from a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Consequently, in their model firm size does not matter.
Because chain stores are physically differentiated from local stores in
that they are active in more locations than local stores, the paper also re-
lates to the product differentiation literature initiated by Hotelling (1929).
Janssen et al. (2003) study competition between two firms with multiple
outlets (chain stores) on the Salop (1979) circle, where firms sell differen-
tiated products to heterogenous consumers. In their model, outlets from
the same chain are homogenous but outlets across chains are heterogenous.
Whereas Janssen et al. (2003) are concerned with location and pricing deci-
sions of two chains, we are interested in the effect of homogeneity of outlets
from the same chain on consumer choice if alternatively they can buy from
heterogenous single outlet firms.
Aside from explaining the above mentioned price patterns, our model
also provides a simple explanation for the remarkable asymmetry in firms
size as observed, e.g., in the retail and hotel industries because our model
predicts the local stores’ market share is at most one third in equilibrium.6
5For empirical evidence, see Baye et al. (2004).
6For retailing, see, e.g., Bagwell and Ramey (1994), Bagwell et al. (1997), Dinlersoz
(2004) or www.stores.org. According to the last source the sales of Wal-Mart, the largest
retailer in the U.S., were approximately four times as large as those of the second ranked
Home Depot in 2003. For the hotel industry, Michael and Moore (1995) report that 39
5
For alternative explanations for such asymmetries, see, e.g., Besanko and
Doraszelski (2004), Athey and Schmutzler (2001), Bagwell et al. (1997) and
Hausman and Leibtag (2004).
3 The Model
There are two cities E (East) and W (West), each hosting one unit of risk
neutral consumers. Firms sell a homogenous product and each consumer is
assumed to bear exogenously given switching costs s ∈ [0, σ] prior to buying
the good for the first time in any given type of store. The timing of events
is as illustrated in Figure 1. After firms choose their prices at date zero,
each consumer observes the prices in his home city. Consumers then decide
at t = 1 from which firm to buy the good. At the intermediate stage, each
consumer moves to the other city with an exogenously given probability
α ∈ (0, 1). Throughout it is assumed that consumers and firms know this
probability but that ex ante neither firms nor consumers know whether a
particular consumer will move between period one and two. Consumers who
move to the other city then learn the prices prevalent in this city.7 At date
two, regardless of whether the consumer still is in the same city or not, he
decides again from which firm to buy the good or whether not to buy at all.
For simplicity, there is no discounting of future payoffs.
Though for the purpose of a consistent illustration, we stick to the lit-
eral two-city interpretation, the basic framework also applies to many other
situations. For example, if consumers commute within a metropolitan area,
customers of retailers will face problems that are very similar to those in
the two-city interpretation. On the other hand, it is also clear that only the
literal interpretation is appropriate for hotel chains.8
percent of all sales are accounted for by franchise chains.
7For simplicity, we assume that all consumers learn all prices in period two. But this
is clearly without any loss since the period two decisions of consumers who do not move
are not affected by the price of the local store in the other city.
8An additional or alternative interpretation is that α is the probability of a preference
shock for related goods, say, cosmetics. A chain store or brand like, e.g., NIVEA, can then
insure consumers against the cost of switching by offering several cosmetic products.
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Figure 1: Time line.
3.1 Interpretation of Switching Costs
The switching costs considered in this paper have the interpretation of a fixed
cost of consumption. This is easily understood if one considers two different
supermarkets, each of whom sells a set of products (or brands) that at most
partially overlaps with those sold by its competitor. Assume also that each
consumer can find his optimal consumption bundle in either one of the two
supermarkets, but that finding or putting together this consumption bundle
involves a fix cost s > 0, which may be due to time spent searching for
the products or to the (opportunity) cost of experimenting with different
products.9 If a consumer has invested s for one of the two supermarkets,
he will no longer be indifferent between the two supermarkets though he
would have been indifferent between the two ex ante. Thus, the fix cost s is
equivalent to a switching cost.
A similar reasoning applies in the case of hotels, although for hotels,
search costs for customers do typically not accrue when searching within
a given establishment but when searching across different hotels in a given
city. So as to minimize search costs, a consumer who has found a suitable
hotel that is part of a chain in one city may want to go to a hotel belonging
to the same chain when staying in another city.
9Note that though consumers are modelled as homogenous with respect to utility gen-
erated by consumption, this is without loss since the only thing that matters is that absent
switching costs, each consumer is indifferent between two different sellers if they set the
same price.
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Viewing switching costs in this way also motivates the informational
assumption of the model. If consumers do not know what kind of stores to
expect in a yet unfamiliar city, they are quite probably also uncertain about
the prices prevailing in this city. Therefore, consumers only learn all prices
in the other city after moving to this city. However, if a chain store is present
in their home city as well as in the other city, consumers know exactly what
prices to expect at the chain store in the other city. A consumer deciding
whether to buy at the local or chain store at t = 1 thus knows the local
store’s price in his home city and the chain store’s price charged in both
cities. He is, however, uncertain about the price of the local store in the
other city.
3.2 Consumers
There is a continuum of consumers with heterogenous switching costs. Con-
sumers’ switching costs s are uniformly distributed on [0, σ], so that the
density is f(s) = 1
σ
for 0 ≤ s ≤ σ and zero otherwise. The probability
α ∈ (0, 1) of moving to the other city in period two is independent of type s.
Consumers decide at t = 1 and t = 2 whether to buy one unit of the good,
thereby generating gross utility u > σ or not to buy, in which case they get
zero utility. A consumer who buys twice from the same store at price p has
net utility of (u − p − s) + (u − p), while a consumer who buys from two
different stores at prices p′ and p′′ gets a net utility of (u−p′−s)+(u−p′′−s).
3.3 Firms
All firms have constant unit costs of production, which are normalized to
zero. This simplifying assumption allows to disentangle the effects of con-
sumer mobility and switching costs from the effects of increasing returns to
scale. We assume also that firms are committed to charge the same prices
in both periods. There are several possible and plausible justifications for
this assumption. First, period length may simply be too short to make
changing prices worthwhile. For example, if consumers commute and shop
at different locations in a metropolitan area on a daily basis, then changing
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prices from day to day will probably not be optimal for retailers.10 Second,
though this is not part of the present paper, one can imagine a dynamic
game where the number of newcomers in every period is sufficiently large,
so that the bargain-and-rip-off strategy of low initial and high second period
prices does not pay if, as seems realistic, new and old customers cannot be
distinguished (see also von Weizsa¨cker, 1984).11 Third, for industries where
chains are important the assumption of uniform prices over time seems to
be more in accord with casual empirical observations than bargain-and-rip-
off pricing. Finally, uniform prices make the analysis much more tractable.
Though we have no definite results for the alternative with time varying
prices, we do not believe that the assumption of uniform prices is in any
way crucial for our main findings that chain stores are profitable because
they help mobile consumers to economize switching costs.
Firms are also restricted to charge the same price in all locations. This
assumption is obviously of no consequences for local stores. It is, however,
restrictive for chain stores. A chain could choose a low price in one city and
a high price in the other city in order to implement some kind of bargain-
and-rip-off strategy. In the present model, however, a bargain-and-rip-off
strategy as experienced by consumers, say, in W is also a rip-off-and-bargain
strategy when viewed from the perspective of consumers in E. For the
case of perfect information, no pure strategy equilibrium where the chain
stores charge different prices in the two cities exists. The only pure strategy
equilibrium with perfect information is in symmetric prices, but it exists
only for a subset of α’s.12
10Clearly, this argument applies much less for hotel chains because of the arguably
greater time length that elapses between purchases.
11Note that old customers are very unlikely to reveal their type if as a ”reward” for
this they have to pay higher prices. However, if firms are patient enough, they may play
alternating bargain-and-rip-off strategies in equilibrium; see Farrell and Klemperer (2004).
12More precisely, the pure strategy equilibrium exists only for α < 0.35. The proof is
available upon request.
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Figure 2: Demand faced by a local monopolist.
4 Local Monopolies
To set the stage for analyzing the role played by a chain store, the benchmark
case of a local monopolist in each city is considered first. When there are
only local stores, they cannot help consumers save switching costs. Because
a consumer’s decision to buy from a given store will only depend on this
store’s price, each store acts independently of the other one.
Consider the local store in k ∈ {E,W}. Throughout, we use −k to
denote the city other than k. A consumer s in k at t = 1 will choose to shop
at this store if his expected net utility exceeds his switching costs, i.e., if
(2−α)(u−plk)−s ≥ 0. If the same consumer moves to the other city in t = 2,
he will choose the local store in −k, whenever u − pl
−k ≥ s. An analogous
argument applies for consumer s in −k. A generic local store charging price
p is thus confronted with a demand function consisting of three segments. If
the local stores price is very low (i.e., lower than u− σ), all consumers shop
and total demand is 2, consisting of the 2 − α consumers from the original
city and the fraction α who moves over from the other city.
If price is increased, then consumers who move over shop if and only
if u − p − s > 0 ⇔ s < u − p, while still all consumers from the original
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city shop, i.e. 2 − α. This amounts to a demand of (2 − α) + α(u − p)/σ,
where 2− α is overall demand from the home city and α u−p
σ
is the mass of
consumers who move and who consume.
If price is increased further, then also some consumers from the original
city prefer not to shop at all. Consumers with (2−α)(u− p)− s < 0 do not
shop at all. Total demand then amounts to (2−α)(2−α)(u− p)/σ +α(u−
p)/σ. In sum, the local store faces demand Q(p) with
Q(p) =


2 p ≤ u− σ
2− α + αu−p
σ
u− σ < p ≤ u− 12−ασ[
(2− α)2 + α
]
u−p
σ
u− 12−ασ < p ≤ u
(1)
Figure 2 provides an illustration. Optimal price is obtained by piecewise
maximizing pQ(p).
First note that optimal price will never be lower than u− σ. Otherwise
the local store could increase its price without losing any customers. Con-
sider next the second segment of demand which applies for prices u − σ <
p ≤ u− 12−ασ. It is easy to see that the price elasticity of demand (defined
negatively) is always greater than minus one if u
σ
< 2(2−α)+α
2
α(2−α) .
13 In this
case, the local store always prefers a higher price, thus driving price up to
the upper bound of this segment, yielding
pˆ = u−
1
2− α
σ
as optimal price and Q(pˆ) = (2−α)
2+α
2−α as quantity demanded.
If the elasticity of demand is always smaller than minus one,14 i.e., if
u
σ
< 2+α
α
, then price will be lowered until the lower bound for this segment,
u − σ, is reached. For values of u
σ
in between these two threshold values,
optimal price is given by the first order condition from maximizing profit,
13The elasticity is −α
σ
p
2−α+α
u−p
σ
, which is bigger than−1 if and only if u > 2p− σ
α
(2−α).
Since p is at most u− 1
2−α
σ, the right-hand side is not greater than 2u− ( 2
2−α
+(2−α))σ.
Re-arranging and simplifying yields the condition in the text.
14From the previous footnote, −α
σ
p
2−α+α
u−p
σ
< −1⇔ u < 2p− σ
α
(2 − α). Since p is at
least u− σ, the right-hand side is larger than 2(u − σ)− σ
α
(2− α), whence the condition
in the text is obtained after some re-arranging.
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yielding
p∗ =
2− α
α
1
2
σ +
1
2
u.
For the third segment of Q(p), the elasticity of demand is smaller than
minus one if u− 12−ασ >
1
2u ⇔
u
σ
> 22−α , in which case the optimal price is
as low as possible, i.e., is equal to the lower bound of the segment. Other-
wise, the optimal price is given by the first order condition on this segment,
yielding
p∗ =
1
2
u.
Summarizing, the optimal price p∗ is given by
p∗ =


u− σ 2+α
α
< u
σ
2−α
α
1
2σ +
1
2u
2(2−α)+α2
α(2−α) <
u
σ
≤ 2+α
α
u− 12−ασ
2
2−α <
u
σ
≤ 2(2−α)+α
2
α(2−α)
1
2u 1 ≤
u
σ
≤ 22−α
. (2)
Welfare Given the zero-one-nature of consumption, maximal welfare with
two local monopolies is achieved when all consumers buy the good in both
periods. The price then only serves a distributional function, shifting rents
from consumers to firms. Note, however, that the local monopolists choose
a price p∗ sufficiently low to induce all consumers choose to buy the good
in both periods only if u
σ
> 2+α
α
. In all other cases, the local monopoly
creates a welfare loss. If two local stores were allowed in each city, then
standard Bertrand competition would drive prices down to zero and restore
the welfare optimum. But this comes at the price of zero profits for the
firms involved. In Section 6 below, we discuss market structure with costly
entry in more detail.
5 Two Local Stores Compete with a Chain Store
The previous section analyzed equilibrium when a local monopolist serves
consumers in each city. The model is now extended by introducing a chain
store that operates an outlet in each city and competes with local stores.
The advantage of patronizing the chain store instead of local stores is that
12
consumers can economize switching costs: Even if they move to the other
city, they can visit the chain store in the new city without incurring addi-
tional set-up or switching costs if they have visited it in period one.
Let plk denote the price of the local store in city k ∈ {E,W} and p
c the
chain store’s price. Remember that consumers in k observe the price of the
local store in −k only period two. In order to decide in period one which
store to patronize, they must thus form expectations about the local store’s
price in −k. Denote by Epl
−k(s) the expected price of the local store in −k
from the perspective of consumer s who lives in k at t = 1.
Since this is a dynamic game with imperfect information,15 the appropri-
ate equilibrium concept is the one of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
In a PBE, players beliefs are updated (where possible) using Bayes’ rule.
Moreover, strategies are required to be sequentially rational and beliefs and
the equilibrium strategy profile must be consistent (see Gibbons, 1992, for
details).
Beliefs of consumer s in k over prices of the local store in −k are repre-
sented by the probability measure µsk(p) ∈ [0, 1]. Because we are concerned
with pure strategies only, any equilibrium belief must put probability one
on a single price p. Any other, non-degenerate distribution of beliefs cannot
constitute an equilibrium since putting positive weight on at least two prices
is not consistent with the firm choosing a single price, which is what a firm
does in a pure strategy equilibrium. Attention can therefore be restricted
to expected prices Eplk(s), keeping in mind that these reflect the degenerate
beliefs with µsk
(
Eplk(s)
)
= 1. Analogously, the possibility that two or more
groups of consumers hold different expectations about the local store’s price
can be ruled out. If some group put weight on p and another one on p′, with
p 6= p′, at most one group of consumers will have a belief that is consistent
with the equilibrium strategy profile. But inconsistent beliefs are ruled out
15When consumers take their decision in t = 1, they do not know the prices of the
local store in the other city. Hence, not all previous history of the play is known by every
player, and consequently, this is a game with imperfect information; see Gibbons (1992).
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by the definition of a PBE. In any pure strategy PBE, we therefore have
Eplk = Ep
l
k(s)
for all s. These findings are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In any PBE in pure strategies all consumers s in −k hold the
same beliefs about the local store’s price in k. These beliefs are a degenerate
distribution and can be represented by the expected price Eplk. Furthermore,
equilibrium beliefs are correct, i.e., Eplk = p
l
k.
Consider next what prices firms charge in equilibrium. If all firms charge
the same price, all consumers will choose to patronize the chain because it
economizes on expected switching costs, thus leaving local stores with zero
profits. The next lemma shows that the chain store charges a higher price
than local store’s in equilibrium.
Lemma 2. 0 < plk < p
c for k ∈ {E,W} in any pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that plk ≥ p
c. Then nobody in k chooses the local store in
t = 1. In t = 2 new consumers arrive, who either chose the chain or local
store in −k at t = 1. Those who chose the local store in −k will choose the
chain in k since it is cheaper. The same reasoning applies for the chain store
customers from −k. The consumers who were already in k in t = 1 all chose
the chain store in t = 1 and will do so again in t = 2. In summary, with
plk ≥ p
c (assuming that everybody visits the chain in case of a tie) the local
store in k will have no customers at all. The only situation where this could
be part of an equilibrium is when prices are such that plk ≥ p
c = 0 because
in this case (and only in this case) the local store is indifferent between
having customers and having none. We now show that plk ≥ p
c = 0 cannot
be an equilibrium. To see this, note that s > 0 for a positive measure of
consumers. Consequently, the chain can make positive profits by setting a
sufficiently small but positive price pc, so that it attracts a positive measure
of consumers. By setting a price somewhat smaller than pc but still strictly
positive, the local store attracts those consumers with very low switching
costs, so that it realizes positive profits. Hence, plk ≥ p
c cannot be.
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Consumer equilibrium behavior can now be narrowed using the following
two lemmas.
Lemma 3. If consumer s in k chooses the chain in t = 1, then it must be
true that s > max
{
pc − plk, p
c −Epl
−k
}
.
Proof. Consumer s prefers the chain store to local stores if
(u−pck−s)+(1−α)(u−p
c)+α(u−pc) > (u−plk−s)+(1−α)(u−p
l
k)+α(u−Ep
l
−k−s),
which is equivalent to
s >
2− α
α
(pc − plk) + (p
c −Epl
−k),
where the right-hand side is larger than (pc − plk) + (p
c − Epl
−k). From
Lemma 2 it is known that each summand is nonnegative. Hence, s must be
larger than the larger of these two summands.
Lemma 4. Consumer s who chooses the chain in t = 1 will choose the
chain in t = 2 whether he moves or not.
Proof. A consumer s in k choosing the chain in t = 1 will choose the chain
again in t = 2 if not moved since for choosing the local store only in t = 2,
s < pc − plk would have to hold, which contradicts Lemma 3. Similarly,
consumer s who moves to −k in t = 2 would choose the local store in −k
only if s < pc − pl
−k = p
c − Epl
−k, where the equality is due to Lemma 1.
But s < pc − pl
−k = p
c − Epl
−k and choosing the chain in t = 1 is again
precluded by Lemma 3. Finally, if pc > u, consumer s would prefer to stay
inactive in t = 2 when moved. But a consumer who would not buy if moved
had better chosen to buy from the local store in k in t = 1 since by Lemma
2, this is the cheaper store.
Corollary 1. Consumers do not change type of stores from t = 1 to t = 2.
Proof. Local store customers do not switch to the chain store because plk <
pc is given by Lemma 2. According to Lemma 4, chain store customers never
switch to local stores.
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Due to Lemma 2, there will always be some consumers in each city
choosing the local store in t = 1 in any equilibrium. If some consumer s0
chooses to patronize the local store in t = 1, then so will any consumer with
s ∈ [0, s0]. Since according to Corollary 1, consumers do not switch the
type of store between t = 1 and t = 2 and since according to Lemma 4, all
consumers who choose the chain in t = 1 will do so again in t = 2, there are
three strategies relevant for consumers in k:
• always patronize local stores, (l, l, l), with payoff
V k(l,l,l)(s) := (2− α)(u − p
l
k)− s + α(u−Ep
l
−k − s),
• patronize local store in k and patronize no store in−k if moved, (l, l, 0),
with payoff:
V k(l,l,0)(s) := (2− α)(u− p
l
k)− s and
• always patronize the chain store, (c, c, c), with payoff:
V k(c,c,c)(s) := (2− α)(u − p
c)− s + α(u− pc) = 2(u− pc)− s.
Note that if the strategy (l, l, 0) is the preferred strategy for consumer s,
then it must be true that V k(l,l,0)(s) > V
k
(c,c,c)(s), i.e.,
(2− α)(pc − plk) > α(u− p
c). (3)
Since this condition is independent of s, no consumer at all will choose
the chain store in k if it holds. Note that condition (3) can only hold in
equilibrium, if plk 6= p
l
−k. Otherwise, condition (3) holds for both cities
and the chain has no customers at all. This can only be an equilibrium if
plk = p
l
−k = 0, contradicting p
l
k 6= p
l
−k.
Suppose that condition (3) does not hold. In this case the strategy to
shop at the local store as long as not moved (l, l, 0) is dominated by always
choosing the chain store (c, c, c). Consumers are then divided into three
groups. Low switching cost consumers with s ≤ sk always choose local
stores, where
sk :=
2− α
α
(pc − plk) + (p
c −Epl
−k). (4)
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inactive
0 sk s σ
V(l,l,l)(s) V(c,c,c)(s) inactive
Figure 3: Partition of the set of consumers in k provided condition (3) does
not hold.
Medium switching cost consumers with s ∈ (sk, s] always choose chain stores,
where
s := min {2(u− pc), σ} . (5)
High switching cost consumers with
s ∈ [s, σ]
do not shop at all; see Figure 3. The min-operator in (5) is necessary because
the support of s is [0, σ]. Notice that the set of high switching cost consumers
who do not shop can be empty. In deriving the following demand functions,
it is assumed that all consumers shop, i.e., that this set is empty, implying
s = σ. Proposition 1 shows that this is indeed the case in equilibrium.
Given some prices pck ≤ p
c, and Eplk < p
c for both k, the local store in k
thus faces the demand function
Qlk := (2− α)
1
σ
[
2− α
α
(pc − plk) + (p
c −Epl
−k)
]
+α
1
σ
[
2− α
α
(pc − pl
−k) + (p
c −Eplk)
]
.
(6)
Maximizing Qlk(p
l
k)p
l
k with respect to p
l
k for both k yields the first order
condition for the local store in k
0 = 4pc − 2α(2 − α)Epl
−k − α
2Eplk − 2(2 − α)
2plk with k = E,W. (7)
A local store’s best response function is
pl∗k
(
Eplk, Ep
l
−k
)
=
4pc − 2α(2 − α)Epl
−k − α
2Eplk
2(2 − α)2
. (8)
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The chain store faces demand
Qc(pc) :=
(
2−Qlk
)
pc +
(
2−Ql
−k
)
pc (9)
and maximizes Qc(pc)pc with respect to pc. Its first order condition is
0 = −8pc + 2σα + (2− α)plk + αEp
l
k + (2− α)p
l
−k + αEp
l
−k (10)
If a PBE in pure strategies exists, then consumers’ expectation about
the local store’s price in the other city must be correct, i.e., equilibrium
prices must be a solution to
Eplk = p
l
k for k = E,W. (11)
The three first order conditions (7) for k = E,W and (10) and the two
expectation consistency conditions (11) constitute a linear system of five
equations in pc, plk, p
l
−k, Ep
l
k and Ep
l
−k. The following proposition states
that such an equilibrium exists and that it is unique.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique PBE in pure strategies. Equilibrium
prices are
pl∗ :=
α
(2− α)2 + 2
σ pc∗ :=
α[(2 − α)2 + 4]
4[(2 − α)2 + 2]
σ
with pl∗k = p
l∗
−k = p
l∗. Equilibrium quantities and profits are, respectively,
Ql∗ :=
(2− α)2
(2− α)2 + 2
Qc∗ :=
2[(2 − α)2 + 4]
(2− α)2 + 2
Πl∗ :=
α(2 − α)2
[(2− α)2 + 2]2
σ Πc∗ :=
α[(2− α)2 + 4]2
2[(2− α)2 + 2]2
σ,
where Ql∗k = Q
l∗
−k = Q
l∗ and Πl∗k = Π
l∗
−k = Π
l∗.
Proof. Existence The system of five linear equations (7), (10) and (11)
with k = E,W has a unique solution, which is given by the prices in the
proposition. At these prices, all consumers shop in both cities. We thus
have s∗ = σ. Since the chain store’s profit function was derived under the
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assumption that s ≡ min{2(u−pc), σ} = σ, it is necessary to verify whether
the chain has an incentive to deviate to such a high price that s < σ.
However, this cannot be the case because when deriving the prices, too many
consumers were assumed to buy from the chain store if the assumption s = σ
does not hold. That is, we imposed a too favorable demand facing the chain
store. Consequently, if under this assumption the chain does not choose a
price sufficiently high to induce s∗ < σ, then it will a fortiori not choose
such a high price when demand is smaller.
Next, it needs to be verified whether the chain store has an incentive
to deviate to pc = pl∗ in order to attract all consumers, leaving the local
store with zero demand. If the chain store chooses price pl∗, it attracts Ql∗
additional customers in each city. The additional revenue thereby generated
is pl∗Ql∗ per city. However, in each city the chain store loses the revenue
(pc∗ − pl∗)(2 −Ql∗) on the customers it would have attracted even without
the deviation. Deviation to pl∗ is therefore profitable if only if
∆Π := Ql∗pl∗ −
(
2−Ql∗
)
(pc∗ − pl∗) > 0.
Note that pc∗ − pl∗ = (2−α)
2
4 ≥ 1 for all α, 2−Q
l∗ = 12Q
c∗ and 12Q
c∗ > Ql∗.
Therefore,
∆Π = pl∗
[
Ql∗ −
1
2
Qc∗
(2− α)2
4
]
≤ pl∗
[
Ql∗ −
1
2
Qc∗
]
< 0.
Hence, it is not profitable for the chain store to deviate to pl∗, or to any
lower price.
Alternatively, a local store could deviate to a lower price in order to push
the chain store out of the market completely. Fix the chain store’s and the
other local store’s prices at pc∗ and pl∗ respectively. The local store in k
could then set its price so low as to make condition (3) hold. To this end it
must choose price plk ≤ p
D, where pD is such that condition (3) holds with
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equality, i.e.,
(2− α)(pc∗ − pD) = α(u− pc∗)
⇔
pD :=
2pc∗ − αu
2− α
.
But
2pc∗ =
(2− α)2 + 4
2(2− α)2 + 4
ασ < ασ < αu,
where the last inequality holds by assumption. Hence,
pD < 0
follows, proving that the deviation does not pay for a local store. This com-
pletes the proof that the strategy profile and beliefs stated in the proposition
constitute a PBE.
Uniqueness In deriving the above equilibrium prices, two crucial assump-
tions on the prevailing demand structure were made: (i) all consumers shop,
i.e., s∗ = σ and (ii) that condition (3) does not hold.
(i) Suppose that s ≡ min{2(u − pc), σ} < σ. That is, the set of high
switching cost consumers who do not shop at all is non-empty. Notice that
this does not affect the local stores’ profit functions. Consequently, their
first order conditions are still given by (7). With s = 2(u − pc), the chain
store’s profit function is
Πc(pc) =
(
2
2(u− pc)
σ
−Qlk
)
pc +
(
2
2(u− pc)
σ
−Ql
−k
)
,
yielding the first order condition
0 = 4αu + 2pl
−k + 2p
l
k − 8αp
c + αEpl
−k − αp
l
k + αEp
l
k − αp
l
−k − 8p
c (12)
In addition, conditions (11) have to be satisfied. Candidate equilibrium
prices are given as solution to equations (7), (12) and (11). These prices are
p˜l :=
2αu
6 + α[(2− α)2 + α]
p˜c :=
(2− α)2 + 4
4
p˜l.
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These prices, however, imply
s = 2u−
α(α2 − 4α + 8)
α3 − 3α2 + 4α + 6
u > u > σ,
where the first inequality follows because the fraction is less than one for
all α and the second inequality holds by assumption. Thus, there is no
equilibrium with s < σ.
(ii) Suppose that condition (3) holds. That is, assume that the chain
attracts no customers in k. If the chain neither attracts consumers in −k,
then lowering its price is until it attracts some generates positive revenue.
So, assume that the chain attracts some consumers in −k. Then condition
(3) must not hold in −k, implying
pl
−k > p
l
k. (13)
The chain store’s demand is then given by some consumers in −k and
by those of them who move from −k to k. Total demand is thus
Qc(pc) =
2
σ
[s− s−k] =
2
σ
[
s−
2− α
α
(pc − pl
−k)− (p
c −Eplk)
]
.
For the case s = σ, the first order conditions from maximizing pcQc yields
the chain store’s reaction function
pc∗(pl
−k, Ep
l
k) =
1
4
[
ασ + (2− α)pl
−k + αEp
l
k
]
.
Now, condition (3) for city k requires that 2pc > αu + (2 − α)plk. Using
Eplk = p
l
k and inserting p
c∗(pl
−k, Ep
l
k) for p
c, condition (3) reads
1
4
[
ασ + (2− α)pl
−k + αp
l
k
]
>
1
2
[
αu + (2− α)pl
−k
]
⇔
αplk > α(2u− σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>u
) + (2− α)pl
−k > αu
where the last inequality is due to u > σ. Condition (3) in k thus requires
plk > u. But this cannot be an equilibrium since the local store in k has no
consumers in this case.
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For s = 2(u− pc) < σ, the chain store’s profit function is
Πc(pc) =
2
σ
[
2(u− pc)−
2− α
α
(pc − pl
−k)− (p
c −Eplk)
]
pc.
Thus, its reaction function is
pc∗
(
pl
−k, Ep
l
k
)
=
1
4(1 + α)
[
2αu + (2− α)pl
−k + αEp
l
k
]
.
Proceeding as before, one gets
1
4(1 + α)
[
2αu + (2− α)pl
−k + αEp
l
k
]
>
1
2
[
αu + (2− α)pl
−k
]
⇒
1
4
[
2αu + (2− α)pl
−k + αEp
l
k
]
>
1
2
[
αu + (2− α)pl
−k
]
⇔
αplk > (2− α)p
l
−k
⇔
plk > p
l
−k
for condition (3). But this contradicts (13). There exists thus no equilibrium
with condition (3) holding. Hence, the equilibrium is unique.
Discussion Market Shares and Profits. According to Proposition 1, the
chain store’s profits in each city (which are equal to half of the chain store’s
total profit Πc∗) are larger than the profits of a local store. Prices and profits
of both local stores and the chain store increase in α, but Πc∗ increases faster
in α than Πl∗. Note also that Qc∗(α) is strictly increasing in α. It equals
8/3 for α = 0 and is equal to 10/3 for α = 1. Because equilibrium demand
aggregated over both periods and both cities is four, the chain store’s market
coverage increase from 2/3 to 5/6 as α increases from zero to one.
Predicted Price Differences. The model predicts also that local stores
charge lower prices than chain stores. To see this, notice that
pc∗ =
(2− α)2 + 4
4
pl∗ > pl∗
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for all α. At first sight, this may seem at odds with empirical facts if
one thinks of, say, the retail industry.16 However, this indicates only that
switching costs are not the only driving factor in the retail industry, where
increasing returns and market power on the input side may be at least as
important. On the other hand, there are other industries where observed
pricing patterns are hard to understand without the factors that our model
emphasizes. As mentioned at the very beginning, a local provider of bus
trips from New York City to Boston is substantially cheaper than the large
chain. Similarly, the regional airline German Wings offers flights that are
cheaper by orders of magnitude than those of Lufthansa. Starbucks, the
largest coffee house chain, is not exactly known for providing cheap coffee,
though the price differences here are certainly less striking than those for
bus trips or airfares. Casual empiricism in the hotel industry also suggests
that large chains are by no means cheaper than local hotels offering the
same quality. More importantly, though, there is also some systematic evi-
dence that is in line with the price pattern predicted by our model from the
banking industry. Ishii (2004) estimates the effect of ATM surcharges on
retail banking industry structure and welfare.17 Surcharges for withdrawing
cash from banks other than the one at which a customer has his or her de-
posit account impose a cost of switching banks to the consumer. Ishii finds
that consumers prefer banks with larger ATM networks, arguably because of
lower expected surcharge payments. She finds that banks with larger ATM
networks pay lower interest rates on deposits, which corresponds to charging
a higher price in our model.
Public Prices of Local Stores. The assumption that local stores’ prices are
only known locally has some consequences that are worth a brief discussion.
Consider the local store in k. Differentiating its best response function (8)
with respect to consumers’ expectations Eplk yields
∂pl∗k (Ep
l
k)
∂Epl
k
= −
1
2
(
α
2− α
)2
< 0.
16See, e.g., Hausman and Leibtag (2004).
17See also Knittel and Stango (2005).
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That is, the lower the expected price, the higher the optimal price of the
local store in k. The reason for this is straightforward. A lower expected
price implies a larger demand, and the larger demand in turn induces the
local store to set a higher price. However, since in equilibrium consumers
cannot be fooled, Eplk = p
l
k must hold, implying that a high price and low
expected price are not consistent.
This behavior is reminiscent of the well known problem of the durable
goods seller uncovered by Coase (1972), in which consumers’ (correct) ex-
pectations of lower future prices reduce demand in the presence, as a con-
sequence of which price in the presence is reduced as well. A durable goods
seller who could commit not to lower its price in the future would make a
larger profit. Very similarly, the local stores in our model could gain if they
could credibly communicate their prices in both cities in period one, thereby
committing themselves not to ”cheat” on consumers.18
Having said that, we should emphasize that the assumption that local
stores’ prices are not completely public information is not only more realistic
than assuming that they are known in both cities, but it is also without
consequences for the qualitative predictions of our model. If we assumed
instead that the prices of local stores are known in both cities in period one,
the chain store would still set a higher price and make a larger profit than
local stores.
18Assuming that only the local store in k communicates its price in both cities, Eplk
has to be replaced by plk in the demand functions of the two local stores and of the chain.
Everything else remains the same. Equilibrium prices then are:
pˆ
l
k =
1
2
σα
−12α + 5α2 + 8
48− 104α + 93α2 − 40α3 + 8α4
,
pˆ
l
−k = Eˆp
l
−k = σα
4 − 6α + 3α2
48 − 104α + 93α2 − 40α3 + 8α4
,
and
pˆ
c = σα
8 − 16α + 13α2 − 5α3 + α4
48 − 104α + 93α2 − 40α3 + 8α4
.
It can be checked that pˆlk > p
l∗
k holds and that equilibrium profit is larger when price is
known in both cities.
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6 Industry Equilibrium with Costly Entry
So far, we took market structures as given. In section 4, we analyzed the
market structure with local monopolies, and in the previous section we ana-
lyzed the interplay of a chain store that competes with a local store in every
city. An interesting question is whether one of these configurations is stable
in the sense that all firms that are active make non-negative profits and that
no additional firms have incentives to enter the market.
As has already been seen, though local monopolies make positive profits,
the market structure with a local monopoly in each city is not stable because
a chain can profitably enter. So as to show that the market structure of
section 5 is stable, we thus have to show that no additional local store and
no additional chain has an incentive to enter if this market structure prevails.
Lemma 5. If there are two or more stores of the same type (local or chain)
in a city, at least two of them charge a price of zero, and all stores of the
this type make zero profits.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that some firm makes positive profits. The
only way that this can happen is that it charges a positive price. But
given that this firm serves customers at a positive price, another firm of
the same type will have an incentive to slightly undercut this price and get
all the customers from this firm. Clearly, this race to the bottom will only
stop if one of the firms charges a price equal to zero. So that a firm that
charges a price of zero has no incentive to raise its price, it must be the
case that another firm sets a price of zero as well. This proves the claim
about equilibrium prices. As to profits, note first that all firms that charge
a price of zero trivially make zero profits. Second, any firm that charges a
higher price will have no customers and consequently will make zero profits,
too.
Lemma 5 implies that the market structure with one local store in each
city and one chain serving both cities is the unique market structure if entry
into the industry is associated with some positive costs. Starting with no
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firms at all, either a local or a chain store can profitably enter the market.
If a local store enters, no other local store will enter the same city, since
profits would be zero. Another local store will only enter in the other city.
If there is a local store in each city, a chain can still enter profitably but,
due to Lemma 5, not more than one chain will enter. Thus, we have:
Proposition 2. With small but positive entry costs, the unique stable mar-
ket structure consists of a chain store with an outlet in both cities and a local
store in each city.
Regarding welfare, this market structure only achieves second best. Since
u > σ and since there are no production costs, it is optimal that all con-
sumers consume the good in both periods. As Proposition 1 showed, all
consumers shop in equilibrium in both periods. However, some of them
shop at local stores and are thus confronted with expected switching costs
of (1 + α)s.
With two competing chains, prices are zero and all consumers shop in
both periods. But now, expected switching costs are only s for all consumers.
Therefore, first best would be achieved by two competing chains. But as
just argued, this is not a stable market structure. The only stable market
structure with one chain and a local shop in each city, thus generates higher
welfare than do two local monopolists, but does not attain first best welfare.
7 Conclusions
We study a two city model where mobile consumers face costs of switching
sellers. Since consumers change the city with an exogenous probability, they
can reduce expected switching costs by shopping at a chain store rather
than at a local store. If consumers differ with respect to switching costs,
firm size serves as a means of product differentiation, where local stores
serve low switching cost consumers and chain stores serve high switching
cost consumers.
This model provides three key insights. First, the market structure with
a local store and a chain store in each city is the unique stable market
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structure if there is a small, positive cost of entry. That is, local stores
coexist in equilibrium with the chain store. Second, the chain store charges
a higher price than local stores. Third, as consumers become more mobile,
the market share of the chain store increases, and so do profits and prices
of all stores. Moreover, the chain store becomes more profitable relative to
local stores as mobility increases.
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